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Abstract— TID and SEE testing was performed on Altera 
Cyclone FPGAs.  The devices exhibit slight performance 
degradation to a TID of 1 Mrad (Si), but also exhibited SEL at a 
low LET.) 
Keywords-FPGA, Altera Cyclone, radiation, TID, SEE, SEU, SEL 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Altera is a large commercial Field Programmable Gate 
Array (FPGA) supplier, but little is known about the suitability 
of their parts for space applications.  The objective of this 
experiment was to establish a baseline tolerance to total 
ionizing dose (TID) effects and single event effects (SEE) for 
an Altera commercial FPGA device. The device selected was 
representative of the current state of the art for commercial 
FPGAs. These tests exposed the devices to radiation levels seen 
space applications. These tests were established to determine 
the viability of using these devices in current and future 
designs, and to highlight the susceptible elements of the FPGA 
for possible re-design using design hardening approaches.  
The selected device is Altera Cyclone Part # EP1C6-
Q240C8. This device was chosen to represent the current 
device family of the manufacturer. A small device was chosen 
to reduce testing complexity. The Altera Cyclone FPGA family 
is based on a 1.5-V, 0.13-µm, all-layer copper SRAM process, 
with densities up to 20,060 logic elements (LEs) and up to 288 
kbits of RAM. The version chosen for this test contains 5,980 
LEs and 80 kbits of RAM. It includes two phase-locked loops 
(PLLs) for clocking and a dedicated double data rate (DDR) 
interface to meet DDR SDRAM and fast cycle RAM 
(FCRAM) memory requirements. The Cyclone device also 
contains a cyclic redundancy check (CRC) error checking of 
the configuration memory. The device is packaged in a cavity 
up 240-pin plastic quad flat pack. The Cyclone is a reduced 
feature-set version of the Altera Stratix FPGA. The Cyclone 
and Stratix devices are manufactured in the same process, 
which allows the results for the Cyclone to be extrapolated to 
the Stratix. 
 
II. TEST METHODOLOGY 
A. TID Tests 
1. The first test will look at the configuration memory of 
the device. Using an alternating pattern (checkerboard), 
the device will be irradiated to a predetermined level. 
Once at that level the device will be tested to determine 
if the programmed configuration is still valid. If it is 
not valid, the device will be considered to have failed 
functionally. If the configuration is valid, the device 
will be configured with the inverted pattern 
(checkerboard not). If the device can be configured it 
will undergo the next level of irradiation. If the device 
cannot be configured, it will be considered a functional 
failure. This test sequence will continue until there is a 
functional failure. Any parametric failure will be noted 
and the testing resumed.  
2. The second test will measure the speed of the device 
versus the supply current at the specified radiation 
levels. It is expected that the speed will decrease as the 
radiation level increases. The supply current will be 
incremented from the minimum supply voltage to the 
maximum supply voltage in predetermined steps. The 
frequency will be increased from 100 kHz to the point 
where the output does not match the input in specified 
increments. The configuration will use a simple shift 
register of 1024 bits that utilizes a significant number 
of logic elements, where the term significant is defined 
as greater than 50 percent of the useable logic 
elements. A single input and single output will be used 
for this test.  
3. The third test will evaluate the input and output 
parameters of the device under increasing radiation 
levels. Parameters include input leakage current, output 
drive current, etc. Pre-radiation measurements will be 
taken to determine the baseline measurements. The 
device will undergo irradiation at predetermined 
increments. At the specified levels, parametric 
measurements will be taken. These measurements will 
be compared with the baseline measurements and those 
defined in the data sheet [1]. These steps will be 
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repeated until the measurements fall outside the limits. 
This point will be noted and the testing continued until 
a functional failure occurs. 
B. SEE Tests 
1. The first test will watch for power supply excess 
current or single event latchup (SEL).  Configure the 
part with a static pattern and don’t clock it. Expose the 
part to the beam while another FPGA monitors core 
and I/O currents for a sudden large increase. Continue 
to monitor the part for 60 seconds to determine if it’s 
going to latch up. If the part latches-up, command the 
crowbar transistors “ON” to protect the part from 
excess dissipation. If latch-up occurs, shut-off power, 
re-establish power and go back to A. If no latch-up 
occurs, move on to test 2. 
2. The second test will measure configuration upsets.  
Configure parts and allow them to remain static. 
Increase the dose rate until configuration CRC errors 
occur. Reconfigure and repeat until the dose rate is 
adjusted to get an average of one error every 30 
seconds. 
3. The third test will measure register and flip-flop upsets. 
Configure eight 512 bit shifters in the device. Clock in 
data to fill all registers and turn clock off when all are 
full. Irradiate the part for a specified time. Shift all data 
out of the shifters and record all errors. 
4. The fourth test will measure RAM upsets. Load a 
configuration to initialize a specific pattern in the 
RAM. Allow the RAM to remain static. Radiate the 
part for a specific period of time. Read the RAM and 
record number of errors and position in RAM for each 
error. 
5. The last test will measure combinatorial logic transient 
upsets.  Configure a serial cloud of combinatorial logic 
using almost all LUT logic in the device. Connect the 
output of the combinatorial logic to a D flip-flop, D 
input.  Connect the input to the cloud to a static “0” 
(low) source.  Clock the flip-flop at a frequency just 
below a frequency corresponding to the propagation 
delay of the cloud and record the errors.  
III. TID TEST RESULTS 
The Altera Cyclone device was tested for TID irradiation 
effects at two sources. The first source was the Low Energy 
X-Ray (LEXR) source at AFRL/VSSE, Kirtland AFB, New 
Mexico. One part was tested at this facility, Part #1, as a check 
of the test set-up and system. This site was also used to 
correlate data between the two types of sources. The second 
source was the Cobalt-60 source, also located at AFRL/VSSE, 
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico. Two parts, Part #9 and Part #10, 
were tested at this facility. Measurements were taken on several 
parameters of the target FPGA. The last part irradiated, Part 
#10, was placed in an oven under bias and annealed at 100°C 
for 168 hours.  
The device configurations were the same for all three tests. 
The 4000-shift register chain with PLL was used. The device 
was held under constant bias throughout the duration of the 
tests and exercised at the intervals indicated. The device 
irradiated at the LEXR was de-capped to expose the bare die. 
The devices irradiated at the Co-60 were fully packaged. 
The results of the three tests follow: 
1. No functional failures of the configuration of the 
memory were observed to 1 Mrad (Si) and after 
annealing. 
2. Fig. 1 shows the degradation of maximum frequency 
versus TID with various conditions placed on device 
#10.  The data demonstrates the functionality of the 
device to 1 Mrad (Si) as long as some margin is 
incorporated into the maximum operating frequency. 
3. Fig. 2 shows the core current and I/O current for the 
three devices as the radiation levels were increased. 
There was no noticeable effect on the I/O current. This 
may be due to the fact that we weren’t using a large 
number of the I/O resources. The core current begins to 
increase rapidly around 120 krad (Si) under irradiation 
from the Cobalt-60 source and around 250 krad (Si) 
under irradiation from the LEXR source. Device 
number 10 had its bias maintained following the test 
and was placed in an oven at 100°C. After 120 hours 
the device was removed and tested. The device 
recovered fully from the radiation effects with the core 
and I/O currents returning to normal. Parametric test 
results remained the same. 
IV. SEE TEST RESULTS 
Latchup testing was first to be attempted.  The beam was 
set using gold with an LET of 96 and was turned on, and the 
device immediately latched-up on both core and I/O supplies. 
The FPGA on the motherboard sensed the latched conditions 
within about 0.5 seconds. Manual reconfiguration of the device 
was attempted, but failed.  After the beam was shut off and the 
power recycled on the device, the device resumed normal 
functioning with core and I/O currents returning to the normal 
levels cited above.  Test 1 was repeated three times with 
identical results.  
The beam species was changed to nickel, allowing the LET 
level to be dialed down to 26.6 MeVcm2/mg.  Application of 
the ion beam produced immediate (<0.5 second) core supply 
latch-up, but no I/O latchup was produced.  Manual 
reconfiguration was attempted, but was unsuccessful while the 
beam remained on.  Power cycling resulted in the DUT core 
latching-up every time while the beam remained on. No I/O 
latchup was evident during repeated supply cycling.  The DUT 
came out of latch-up and reconfigured successfully after a final 
power supply cycle with the ion beam turned off.  Core and I/O 
current levels returned to the normal levels as cited above.   
 
 





















Nom  1.5, 3.3V  4K SRs w/PLL
"+10%"   1.67,  3.63V 4K SRs w/PLL
"+15%"   1.72, 3.71V 4K SRs w/PLL
"-10%"   1.33, 2.98V 4K SRs w/PLL
"-15%"   1.25, 2.85V 4K SRs w/PLL
Nom  1.5, 3.3V  4K SRs No PLL
"+10%"   1.67,  3.63V 4K SRs No PLL
"+15%"   1.72, 3.71V 4K SRs No PLL
"-10%"   1.33, 2.98V 4K SRs No PLL
"-15%"   1.25, 2.85V 4K SRs No PLL
Nom  1.5, 3.3V  400 SRs No PLL
"+10%"   1.67,  3.63V 400 SRs No PLL
"+15%"   1.72, 3.71V 400 SRs No PLL
"-10%"   1.33, 2.98V 400 SRs No PLL
"-15%"   1.25, 2.85V 400 SRs No PLL
Nom  1.5, 3.3V 40 SRs No PLL
"+10%"   1.67,  3.63V 40 SRs No PLL
"+15%"   1.72, 3.71V 40 SRs No PLL
"-10%"   1.33, 2.98V 40 SRs No PLL
"-15%"   1.25, 2.85V 40 SRs No PLL
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Figure 2.  Supply Currents vs. TID. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Altera Cyclone device exhibited latchup at LET 
levels below 35 MeVcm2/mg. As a result, the part is deemed 
unusable in space applications, as it currently exists.  If 
future versions of the Cyclone or the Stratix family do not 
exhibit this latchup problem, then the remainder of the SEE 
evaluations can be completed. 
The TID results of the Cyclone devices demonstrated the 
potential of 130 nm bulk CMOS technology.  Without any 
attempt to harden the part, the devices survived to at least 
1 Mrad (Si) with little performance degradation.  This shows 
that standard commercial design methodologies are capable 
of producing devices resistant to TID at the 130 nm 
technology node. 
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